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EFFECT OF THE DOCTRINE OF
RES IPSA LOQUITUR
By FRED E. HECKEL* AND FOWLER V. HARP'ERt
r
It is elementary in the law of torts that the onus of prov-
ing negligence lies upon him who alleges it.1 It is repeatedly de-
clared that negligence will never be presumed.2 Even if there
be a presumption to aid the plaintiff, he must still prove, by a
preponderance of the evidence that defendant has been negligent.'
Some courts, however, regard the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur
as symbolizing the principle of evidence which excepts certain
situations from this general rule.4 Courts which deny that this
amounts to an exception, regard a res ipsa case as merely describ-
ing a situation where the fact and nature of the injury itself "speaks,"
that is, affords proof of negligence,5 so as to relieve the plaintiff
of the initial obligation to show negligence, or rather, perhaps, to
discharge that obligation on his part.'
The basis for this principle is generally said to be in the like-
lihood that negligence caused the injury, in view of the facts of
the case.7  If there must be evidence of negligence, this, then, is
the evidence. Circumstantial evidence is made sufficient, as a
matter of law, to sustain a recovery in the absence of explanation
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2. Kemp v. McNeill Cooperage Co. (1918) 7 Boyce (Del.) 146, 104 At.639; Swanson v. Hood (1918) 99 Wash. 506, 170 Pac. 135; McCombe v.
Public Service Ry. Co. (1920) 95 N. J. L. 187, 112 Atl. 255; Johnson v.Mobile & 0. R. R. Co. (1917) 178 Ky. 108, 198 S. W. 538; Tower v. Hum-boldt Transit Co. (1917) 176 Calif. 602, 169 Pac. 227.3. Spinneweber v. Every (1919) 189 App. Div. 35, 177 N. Y. Supp. 801.4. See Hamilton v. Birmington Ry., Light & Power Co. (1917) 198Ala. 630, 73 So. 950. Cf. Clerk and Lindsell "Torts" (7th ed.) 496.
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6. Cf. Heim v. Roberts (1920) 135 Md. 600, 109 Atl. 329.
7. Cf. Cooley "Torts" (3rd ed.) 1416-1417.
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by defendant." The doctrine may be said to be based on "judicial
notice."" The experience of men, generally, is such as readily
to lead to the inference of negligence in certain situations, because
in the ordinary course of events injury does not occur in the ab-
sence of negligence. 10 The mere fact of injury alone is never
enough to invoke the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur:"1 The cir-
cumstances must make negligence a reasonable inference," if not,
as said by some courts, a necessary one in the absence of explana-
tion.13
But there is still another phase to a res ipsa case. The cir-
cumstances which give rise to the injury must be such as to lie
exclusively within the defendant's knowledge. This may be said
to be the "reason" for the rule,'4 and usually takes the form of
the instrument or appliance causing the injury being under de-
fendant's control and management3 5 Indeed it has been declared
that the instrumentality must have been under the defendant's ex-
clusive control, otherwise the question of proximate cause com-
plicates the issue and destroys the presumptions because the injury
may have been as easily due to the negligence of a third person.'"
8. Mayes v. Kansas City Light & Power Co. (1926) 121 Kan. 648, 249
Pac. 599; Eaton v. New York Cent. & H. R. R. R. Co. (1909) 195 N. Y. 267,88 N. E. 378. Note the following distinction: "When the facts and circum-
stances from which the jury is asked to infer negligence are those immedi-ately attendant on the occurrence, we speak of it as a case of 'res ipsa
loquitur'; when not immediately connected with the occurrence, then it is an
ordinary case of circumstantial evidence": Griffin v. Manice (1901) 166 N. Y.188, 196, 59 N. E. 925. Ordinarily, of course, negligence can be shown by cir-cumstantial evidence: Mulligan v. Atlantic Coast Line (1916)" 104 S. C. 173,
77 S. E. 445; Mathews v. Ala. Gt. So. R. R. Co. (1917) 200 Ala. 251, 76 So.
17; Weleetka Cotton Oil Co. v. Brookshire (1917) 65 Okla. 293, 166 Pac. 408;
Loveland v. Nelson (1926). 235 Mich. 623, 209 N. W. 835; Dei v. Stratigos(1926) 287 Pa, 475, 135 Atd. 111; Lutgen v. Standard Oil Co. (Mo. 1926) 287
S. W. 474.
9. Cf. Russell v. St. Louis & S. 17. R. R. Co. (Mo. 1922) 245 S. W. 590.
10. Cf. Ash v. Childs Dini.q Hall Co. (1918) 231 Mass. 86, 120 N. E.
396; Hoopnman v. Seattle (1922) 122 Wash. 379, 210 Pac. 783.
11. Mardo v. Valley Smokeless Coal Co. (1924) 279 Pa. 209, 123 Atl.
779; New v. Bradshaw, (1922) 89 Okla. 205, 214 Pac. 557.
12. Carter Oil Co. v. Independent Torpedo Co. (1924) 107 Okla. 209, 232Pac. 419; Lakey v. North McAlester Coal Co. (1924) 98 Okla. 130, 224 Pac.309; Exporters, etc., Warehouse Co. v. Schulse (Tex. 1924) 265 S. W. 133.
13. Goldman, etc., Bottling Co. v. Sindell (1922) 140 Md. 488, 117 Atl.
866.
14. Cf. Wigmore "Evidence" (2nd ed.) 2509 p. 498.
15. Scellars v. Universal Service (1924) 68 Calif. App. 252, 228 Pac. 879;
Sullivan v. Minneapolis St. Ry. Co. (1924) 161 Minn. 45, 200 N. W. 922; Syl-
via v. Newport Gaslight Co. (R. I. 1924) 124 Atl. 289; Sund v. Wilmington,
etc., Traction Co. (Del. 1920) 114 Atl. 281.
16. Larrabee v. Des Moines Tent Co. (192-0) 189 Iowa 319, 178 N. W.
373.
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Finally, the agency causing the injury must have been under the
defendant's control both at the time of the injury' and at the time
of the negligent acts which it is presumed caused the injury.18
The application of the doctrine is as varied as the effect of
its application, which we shall discuss later. It is said by some
courts that it may be invoked only where the facts of the occur-
rence warrant the inference of negligence, and the pleader, be-
cause of the nature of the case, is unable to point out the specific
acts which caused the injury.19 On the other hand, at least one
jurisdiction restricts its application to situations wherein there is
an absolute duty or obligation amounting to that of an insurer
in which case, it is said, a presumption of negligence is raised.20
Ordinarily, of course, a contractual relationship between plaintiff
and defendant is not necessary for the application of res ipsa,21
although there are cases and dicta which indicate otherwise.2 2  It
seems that Michigan has refused to recognize the principle in any
form,23 and the court in that jurisdiction has so committed itself
in terms,24 but some of the later cases apparently beg the question.2 5
Illinois has denied the advantages of res ipsa loquitur to a tres-
passer,'26 although it is difficult to see the logic thereof.
Different jurisdictions seem hopelessly in conflict upon the ef-
fect of pleading or attempting to prove specific acts of negligence
in a case which is properly the subject of the application of res
ipsa loquitur. In Missouri, it is consistently held that the allega-
tion of specific acts of negligence precludes plaintiff from taking
advantage of the doctrine.27  This seems to be the rule in Texas2 8
17. National Biscuit Co. v. Wilson (Ind. 1906) 78 N. E. 251.18. ;Goldinan, etc., Bottling Co. v. Sindell supra, note 13.
19. tKing v. Davis (1924) 296 Fed. 986.
20. Fitzpatrick v. Penfield (1920) 267 Pa. 564, 109 At. 653; Johns v.Pa. R. R. Co. (1916) 226 Pa. 319. 75 Atd. 408.
21. 'Bloom v. Cullmnan (1916) 197 Ala. 490, 73 So. 85.
22. Kirby v. Canal Co. (1897) 20 App. Div. 473, 46 N. Y. Supp. 777. Ifsuch a distinctiorl ever existed in New York, it could scarcely survive suchcases as MacPherson v. Buick Co. (1916) 217 N. Y. 382, 111 N. E. 1050; andGlanzer v. Shepard (1922) 233 N. Y. 236, 135 N. E. 275.23. -Renders v. Grand Trunk R. R. Co. (1906) 144 Mich. 387, 108 N. W.368; Lincoln v. Detroit & M. Ry. Co. (1914) 179 Mich. 189, 146 N. W. 405,
semnble.24. Burghardt v. Detroit United Ry. Co. (1919) 206 Mich. 545, 173 N.W. 360.25. See Loveland v. Nelson (1926) 235 Mich. 623, 209 N. W. 835. Cf.also Fuller v. Magatti (1925) 231 Mich. 213, 203 N. W. 868.26. McClain v. Chicago & N. W. R. R. Co. (1905) 121 IIl. App. 614.27. Kennedy v. Metropolitan St. Ry. Co. (1907) 128 Mo. App. 297, 107 S.W. 16; Mullery v. Missouri & Kansas Tel. Co. (1914) 180 Mo. App. 128, 168S. W. 213; Bogress v. Wabash R. R. Co. (Mo. 1924) 266 S. XV. 333.28. Davis v. Castile (Tex. 1924) 257 S. W. 870; Wichita Valley R. R. Co.
v. Helns (Tex. 1924) 261 S. W. 225.
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and in the federal courts, 29 but the contrary is the rule in Washing-
ton, 30 Connecticut, 31 Virginia,32 Massachusetts, and probably in
New York.34  The better reasoning as well as the weight of au-
thority seems to be with the latter result. To have a good com-
plaint, the plaintiff must plead negligence. He cannot plead less
than this, and, by alleging the specific acts of negligence, he does
not do more, so there is no good reason to deny the application
of res ipsa, if it is properly applicable, merely because the plaintiff
has attempted to show particular acts of negligence. 35
Some authorities regard the doctrine as a principle of evi-
dence3G while others insist upon treating it as a rule of the sub-
stantive law of tort.' 7  The results of its application have been
varied and the theories upon which it is applied are by no means
in harmony. This is largely due to a looseness in language of
courts 3 and a confusion between the different so-called "presump-
tions" which are said to be raised. It should be helpful to inquire
into the origin of the doctrine and thereafter take up in detail
the different results that have followed, and should follow, upon
the theories announced by the courts.
II
The leading English case, and one of the first to formulate
the specific doctrine of res ipsa loquitur is Byrne v. Boadle.39 Here
it appeared that the plaintiff, while walking along the public street,
was struck by a barrel of flour falling from a window above, The
29. The Great Northern (1918) 251 Fed. 826.
30. Walters v. Seattle, etc., Ry. Co. (1908) 48 Wash. 233, 93 Pac. 419;
Kiuska v. Yeoinans (1909) 54 Wash. 465, 103 Pac. 819.
31. ,Firszt v. Capitol Park Realty Co. (1923) 98 Conn. 627, 120 Atl. 300.
32. Washington-Virginia Ry. Co. v. Bouknight (1912) 113 Va. 696, 75 S.
E. 1032.
33. McNamara v. Boston & M. R. R. Co. (1909) 202 Mass. 491, 89 N. E.131; Cook v. Newhall (1913) 213 Mass. 292, 101 N. E. 72; Hull v. Berkshire
St. Ry. Co. (1914) 217 Mass. 361, 104 N. E. 747; Vleary v. Cavanaugh (1914)
219 Mass. 281, 106 N. E. 998.34. Clarke v. Nassau Electric Ry, Co. (1896) 9 App. Div. 51, 41 N. Y.
Supp. 78.35. See Firszt v. Capitol Park Realty Co. supra, note 31, 120 Atl. 300, at306.
36. Christenson v. Oregon Short Line (1909) 35 Utah 137, 99 Pac. 676;St. Louis, S. F. & T. R. R. Co. v. Cason (1910) 59 Tex. Civ. App. 323, 129 S.
W. 394; Wright v. Elkhorn Consolidation Coal & Coke Co. (1918) 182 Ky.423, 206 S. W. 634; Rost v. Kee, etc., Dairy Co. (1920) 216 Ill. App. 497.
37. Cf. Pollock "Torts" (11th ed.) 524-527. Cf. also the language ofKephart, J., in Fitzpatrick v. Penfield (1920) 267 Pa. 564, 109 Atl. 653, 658.38. Cf. Wigmore "Evidence" (2nd ed.) 2509 p. 493.39. (1863) 2 H. & C. 722, 159 Eng. Repr. 299.
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plaintiff could testify nothing as to the accident save that he had
suddenly been injured by some falling object. Yet he had averred
negligence in his pleading. Two eye witnesses testified that they
saw a barrel falling, but could offer no evidence as to the reason
for the accident, if "accident" it could be called. Because the
plaintiff sought to recover on the grounds of negligence and there
was no evidence of negligence, the court non-suited the plaintiff.
But in the Court of Exchequer, it was unanimously held that
the non-suit was improper and that the plaintiff had in fact offered
evidence, by proof of the injury under the circumstances, to sus-
tain a verdict for damages. He had made out a prima facie case
which was sufficient to go to the jury. "If there are any facts
inconsistent with negligence," said Pollock, C. B., "it is for the
defendant to prove them." It was incumbent upon the defendant
to disclose the circumstances of the falling of the barrel, if they
indicated that he had exercised due care. If he had not, he could
not complain if the jury so found. The court thought that a barrel
"could not roll out of a warehouse without some negligence, and to
say that the plaintiff who is injured by it must call witnesses from
the warehouse to prove negligence" was preposterous.40
Seven years after Byrne v. Boadle a similar result was ob-
tained in Kearney v. London, B. & S. C. R. R. C6.1 Here it was
found that the circumstances of a brick falling from a wall in a
bridge upon the plaintiff causing him injury amounted to sufficient
evidence of negligence to warrant a jury in finding an affirmative
verdict in his favor. While the immediate question to decide in
each of these cases was raised as to the propriety of a non-suit,
the language used by the judges seems to be responsible for much
of the confusion in subsequent cases as to the nature of the pre-
sumptions raised by a res ipsa case. These confusing dicta will
be recalled shortly.
Preliminary to examining the effects of the two English cases
and the language which the courts indulged in, it is well to look
at the possible situations which might ensue when "presumptions"
are raised. At the outset of a case, the plaintiff is said to be under
(1) the burden of convincing the jury of the issue upon which
he predicates his claim to recover, and (2) the burden of producing
evidence for the jury to consider. We sometimes refer to the
40. Ibid., at 728.
41. (1870) L. R. 5 Q. B. 411.
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first as the burden of proof and the second as the burden of going
forward with the evidence.4 2
Now the question may be raised whether the plaintiff may
satisfy the second burden, that is, the burden of producing evidence
for the jury to consider, without satisfying the first burden, the
burden of proof. The answer obviously is yes. As soon as the
burden of producing evidence is satisfied, the jury is entitled to
consider the case and upon its verdict will depend the answer to
the first question, the burden of proof.4 3 If the verdict is for the
plaintiff, he has, of course, satisfied the burden of proof, for he
has obtained an affirmative verdict.
The next question is whether the plaintiff may satisfy the
second burden, the burden of producing evidence, without that bur-
den's shifting to the defendant. The answer again seems to be yes.
The burden is satisfied as soon as plaintiff has produced enough
evidence to warrant the jury in finding in his favor, although it is
not necessarily required to so find.4 4  This is not a situation to
warrant a directed verdict, for the defendant may do as he chooses
about producing any evidence to rebut the plaintiff's evidence.45
The latter is assured that he will get to the jury but he is not
assured of getting a verdict in his favor, for it is not yet ascer-
tained whether he has satisfied the burden of proof. He has merely
satisfied the burden of producing evidence. The case is, by hy-
pothesis, a doubtful one, and consequently the jury must pass upon
it. The defendant is in no way obliged to produce evidence. The
burden has not shifted, for the plaintiff has barely satisfied his
burden. If he had not done so, there would have been nothing
for the jury to consider, and a verdict would have been directed
for the defendant.4
With these distinctions in mind, it is seen that there are three
different types of what are sometimes called presumptions possible
in a negligence case. In the first place, the plaintiff must produce
some evidence of negligence. This is elementary. He has a bur-
42. See Thayer "Preliminary Treatise on Evidence" (1898) 355. Cf. Ala-bama & V. Ry. Co. v. Groome (1910) 97 Miss. 201, 52 So. 703.43. ,Cf. Colorado Springs, etc., Ry. Co. v. Reese (1917) 69 Colo. 1, 169
Pac. 572.
44. Wigmore 2487 (a). But see Hughes v. Atlantic City & S. R. R. Co.(1914) 85 N. J. L. 212, 89 Ati. 769, where the court argues that as soon as oneparty has made out a prima facie case, the burden to go forward with evidenceshifts to the other party. This is clearly wrong, for under such a theory, averdict would have to be directed against the party to whom the burden shiftedif he failed to produce evidence. See note 46, infra.45. Wigmore "Evidence" 2487 (b).46. Ibid., 2494 (2).
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den of offering some evidence to the jury that the defendant has
not used due care. If he does not satisfy this burden he has not
made a case. As soon as he has satisfied this initial burden, he
has made what is sometimes called a prima facie case. For the
sake of convenience, we may call this prima facie case presump-
tion number 1. Properly speaking, it is not a presumption,47 but
the situation is one in which the jury might find for the plaintiff,
and consequently the court must presume that it will so find, and
submit the case to it. If negligence is actually found, the verdict
will be sustained.4 8
Then there is the situation where the law declares that some-
thing must be taken for granted as true until doubt is cast upon it.
This is called a presumption because the burden of going forward
with the evidence has definitely shifted to the other party. Unless
he produces some evidence to throw doubt upon the proposition,
it will' be presumed to be true, and he will lose by default. In
this case, a failure to go forward with evidence will justify the court
in taking the case from the jury and directing a verdict for the
party who has the presumption in his favor, because, the proposi-
tion being true until doubt is cast upon it, the jury has nothing to
consider.45  This we shall call presumption number 2.
Finally, there is the situation where the burden of proof rests
upon a party and no evidence is offered to satisfy it. Here there
can be but one possible result. The jury is not entitled to consider
the case on its merits, for there are no merits to it. The court
will always direct a verdict against the party totally failing to sustain
the burden of proof.50 This we shall call presumption number 3,
and then examine the two leading cases to determine which of the
three is actually invoked thereby.
In discussing Byrne v. Boadle Pollock, no mean authority on
torts, deduces that the effect of the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur
is to establish a full presumption, or number 3, in favor of the
plaintiff, which results in throwing the burden of proof upon the
defendant to show, by the weight of evidence, that the injury was
occasioned by no want of due care on his part. "Where damage is
47. This is sometimes designated as an "inference" as distinguished from
a presumption. The inference may be disregarded by the jury, whereas a pre-
sumption; of course, cannot be disregarded. Cf. the illuminating case of
Cogdell v. R. R. Co. (1903) 132 N. C. 852, 44 S. E. 618, quoted in Wigmore"Evidence" 2490, at p. 450, n. 1.
48. Feldman v. Chicago Ry. Co. (1919) 289 Ill. 35, 124 N. E. 334.
49. Wigmore "Evidence" 2495 (b).
50. Webb v. Western Reserve Bond & Share Co. (1926) 115 Ohio St.
247. 153 N. E. 289.
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done by the falling of objects into a highway from a building," it is
stated, "the modern rule is that the accident, in the absence of ex-
planation, is of itself evidence of negligence. In other words, the
burden of proof is on the occupier of the building. If he cannot show
that the accident was due to some cause consistent with the due repair
and careful management of the structure, he is liable."' The
language employed in this decision is consistent with this deduc-
tion. Pollock, C. B., declared, "if an article calculated to cause
damage is put in a wrong place and does mischief, I think that
those whose duty it was to put it in the right place are prima
facie responsible, and if there is any state of facts to rebut the
presumption of negligence they must prove them." 52 Thus, while
the expression prima facie is somewhat misleading, we must under-
stand that if the defendant is required to rebut the presumption of
negligence, and if he must prove such facts as will be necessary
to rebut this presumption, the burden of proof rests upon the de-
fendant to prove to the satisfaction of the jury that he has ex-
ercised due care.
In Kearney v. London, etc., R. R., however, altogether different
language was used, for here the effect of a res ipsa situation is
unmistakably only to throw the burden of going forward with the
evidence upon the defendant. "Anything," said Cockburn, C. J.,
"which tended to rebut the presumption arising from an accident
caused by the defective condition of the brickwoirk, which it was
their duty to keep in repair, even if such evidence were but slight,
might have sufficed; but the defendants chose to leave it on the
naked state of facts proved by the plaintiff. . . . Therefore,
there was some evidence to go to the jury, however slight it may
have been, of this accident having arisen from the negligence of the
defendants; and it was incumbent on the defendants to give evi-
dence rebutting the inference arising from the undisputed facts
. .. ."Is Apparently the burden which is here thrown upon
the defendant is that which we designate as arising from presump-
tion number 2, namely, to go forward with evidence tending to
show due care. Slight evidence "might have sufficed"; that is,
all that the defendant was obligated to do was to throw doubt upon
the matter and his burden would have been satisfied.
Of course, the exact nature of the burden in either of the
foregoing cases must be adduced from the dicta. The decision in
51. Pollock "Torts" (lth ed.) 524.
52. Byrne v. Boadle supra, 159 Eng. Repr. 299, 301.
.53. L. R. 5 Q. B. 411, 413.
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each case, however, is authority for a proposition even less than
either of the presumptions suggested. It must be remembered that
the issue was the narrow one whether a non-suit was proper. The
holdings amount to no more than declaring that the plaintiff had
satisfied his initial burden of producing enough evidence to get to
the jury. He could not be non-suited. It does not follow from this
that any burden had shifted to, the defendant. It was said that he
was obligated to explain. From this, and the other language quoted,
the theory of presumptions in these cases has arisen. But the
decisions do not hold that the jury must find for the plaintiff if
there be no explanation; they merely hold that the jury nuzy so
find. The case is still a doubtful one. So, accurately, here is
authority for, no more than presumption number 1, namely, that by
showing a res ipsa case, the plaintiff is assured of getting to the
jury, for he has introduced some evidence of negligence, or, in
other words, he has shown enough evidence of negligence to warrant
an affirmative verdict in his favor if the jury chooses to return
such a verdict, but it remains to be seen whether or not such a
verdict will be returned.54
As might be expected, the extensive industrial and manufactur-
ing activities of America have furnished fertile soil for the growth
of the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur. The confusion arising out
of the leading English cases, however, seems to have increased in
the state courts. All three presumptions are found in the decisions,
in varying degrees of certainty, some courts favoring presumption
number 1, some number 2, some number 3 and still others uncer-
tain as to whether 1, 2, or 3 arises.
North Carolina has consistently clung to the doctrine of pre-
sumption number 1,55 although the language sometimes used is a bit
ambiguous. 58 Thus, it has been said that the doctrine of res ipsa
"requires the defendant to go forward with his proof," but the
plaintiff must nevertheless submit to the jury's conclusions, whether
54. Salmond concurs in this conclusion. "There is not, indeed, even in
these cases any legal presumption of negligence, so that the legal burden ofdisproving it lies on the defendant. But the plaintiff by proving the accident
has adduced reasonable evidence, on which the jurors may, if they think fit,
find a verdict for him": "Torts" (5th ed.) p. 34.
55. Ross v. Double Shoals Cotton Mills (1905) 140 N. C. 115, 52 S. E.121; Morrisett v. Elizabeth City Cotton Mills (1909) 151 N. C. 31, 65 S. E.
514; Kiger v. Liipfert Scales Co. (1913) 162 N. C. 133, 78 S. E. 76; Page V.
Camp Mfg. Co. (1920) 180 N. C. 330, 104 S. E. 667; Harris v. Mangum
(1922) 183 N. C. 235, 111 S. E. 177.
56. Stewart v. Van de Vanter Carpet Co. (1905) 138 N. C. 60, 50 S. E.
562.
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the defendant produces any evidence or not.5 7  This is clearly in-
consistent because the court is saying that the doctrine creates
presumption number 2, but the results are those which attend num-
ber 1. In Dont v. Roper Lumber Co.5 the court lays down the
rule that res ipsa loquitur "makes a prima facie case of negligence
which requires the defendant to go forward with his proof, or
take the chance of an adverse verdict." 9 This indisputably es-
tablished number 1, only. But, peculiarly enough, the court im-
mediately cites an earlier case 60 to* prove that "the accident, the
injury, and the circumstances under which they occurred are, in
some cases, sufficient to raise a presumption of negligence, and thus
cast upon the defendant the burden of establishing his freedom
from fault." There can be no question but that here is enunciated
the theory that res ipsa raises presumption number 3, and definitely
throws upon the defendant the burden of proving due care.6"
These cases are confusing, but there can be no doubt of the fact
that North Carolina has established the first presumption and that
the doctrine does no more than furnish some evidence of negligence
from which the jury may, or need not, conclude that the defendant
has been negligent.52  There are cases which suggest that this is
the effect accorded the doctrine in the federal courts,63 in Connecti-
cut,G4 in Iowa,6 5 in Minnesota, 8 in Oklahoma, 6 7 and perhaps in
Colorado, although it is doubtful in the latter jurisdiction. 5
57. Ibid., 50 S. E. 562, at 565.
58. (1916) 172 N. C. 129. 90 S. E. 18.59. 90 S. E. 18, at 21.60. Ellis v. R. R. (1841) 24 N. C. 138.
61. 90 S. E. 18, at 21.62. See the concise statement of Adams, J., in Harris v. Mangunsupra, 111 S. E. 177, at 179; see also Walker, J., in Page v. Camp supra; and
cf. language in White v. Hines (1921) 182 N. C. 275, 109 S. E. 31.63. Central R. R. Co. of New Jersey v. Peluso (1923) 286 Fed. 661;
Atlas Powder Co. v. Benson (1923) 287 Fed. 797, particularly at p. 798;
Sweeney v. Erving (1913) 228 U. S. 233, 57 L. Ed. 815, 33 Sup. Ct. Rep. 416.64. Stebel v. Connecticut Co. (1915) 90 Conn. 24, 96 Atl. 171; but seeElwood v. Ry. Co. (1904) 77 Conn. 145, 58 At!. 751, which is apparently enun-ciating number 3.65. Hall v. Chicago, R I. L& P. (1924) 199 Iowa 607, 199 N. W. 491,semble. But in Nicoll v. Sweet (1913) 163 Iowa 683, 144 N. W. 615, pre-sumption number 3 is stated in the headnote. It is doubtful, however, if thecase verifies it. See infra, note 74.
66. Holt v. Ten Broeck (1916) 134 Minn. 458, 159 N. W. 1073; Ryan v.St. Paul Union Depot Co. (Minn. 1926) 210 N. W. 32; Kleeninan v. BannerLaundry Co. (1921) 150 Minn. 515, 186 N. W. 123; Sullivan v. MinneapolisSt. Ry. Co. (1924) 161 Minn. 45, 200 N. W. 922.67. Sand Springs Park v. Schrader (1921) 82 Okla. 244, 198 Pac. 983;Okmulgee Gas Co. v. Kelly (1924) 105 Okla. 189, 232 Pac. 428, semble.
68. Colorado Springs, etc., Ry. Co. v. Reese (1917) 69 Colo. 1, 169 Pac.572; but cf. Velotta v. Yampa Valley Coal Co. (191V) 63 Colo. 489, 167 Pac.971, in which apparently number 3 is raised.
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On the other hand the decisions in many other states indicate
either presumption number 2 or number 3, it is not always easy to
determine which. Some New York cases look like presumption
number 2, casting upon the defendant only the burden of going
forward with evidence 6 9 while still others apparently favor pre-
sumption number 3 with the burden of proving due care on the
defendant.70  Arkansas expressly declares that the burden of proof
"shifts," thus establishing number 3.71 Missouri cases seem to
favor this result also, 72 as do cases in Kentucky 3 and some of the
Iowa cases.74 Maryland leans to this rule 5 with Pennsylvania ap-
69. Slater v. Barnes (1925) 241 N. Y. 284, 149 N. E. 859, by language
stating the principle, although the decision held the case not properly the
subject of the res ipsa doctrine; Adams v. Union Ry. Co. of New York City
(1903) 80 App. Div. 136, 80 N. Y. Supp. 264; Dean v. Tarrytown, W. P. &
M. Ry. Co. (1906) 113 App. Div. 437, 99 N. Y. Supp. 250; Sinay v. Chesebro-
Whitman Co. (1913) 140 N. Y. Supp. 1074, doubtful whether 2 or 3; Lou-
doun v. Eighth Ave. R. R. Co. (1900)' 162 N. Y. 380, 56 N. E. 988; Curtis v.
New York, N. H. & H. R. R. Co. (1913) 159 App. Div. 757, 144 N. Y. Supp.
1007; Rice v. Von Der Lieth (1920) 111 Misc. 418, 181 N. Y. Supp. 767;
McNulty v. Ludwiq & Co. (1908) 125 App. Div. 291, 10G N. Y. Supp. 703;
Spinneweber v. Every (1919) 189 App. Div. 35, 177 N. Y. Supp. 801; Mentz
v. Schieren (1901) 36 Msc. 813, 74 N. Y. Supp. 889.
70. Schmidt v. Stern (1922) 119 Misc. 529, 196 N. Y. Supp. 727; Lynch
v. Ley (1922) 119 Misc. 681, 197 N. Y. Supp. 360; Scheider v. American
Bridge Co. (1903) 78 App. Div. 163, 79 N. Y. Supp. 634, but language is gar-
bled; Travers v. Murray (1903) 87 App. Div. 552, 84 N. Y. Supp. 558, sem-
ble; Papazian v. Bauingartner (1906) 49 Misc. 244, 97 N. Y. Supp. 399. A
few of these cases are questionable. There is no doubt but that number 2 is
the farthest presumption that can be deduced from the better New York
cases. There are good eases to indicate that only presumption number 1
results: Griffen v. Manice (1901) 166 N. Y. 188, 59 N. E. 925.
71. Southwestern Telegraph & Telephone Co. v. Bruce (1909) 89 Ark.
589, 117 S. W. 565; Jacks v. Reeves (1906) 78 Ark. 426, 95 S. W. 781; but
in Arkansas Light & Power Co. v. Jackson (1924) 166 Ark. 633, 267 S. W.
359, presumption number 3 is repudiated and apparently presumption number
2 is enunciated.
72. Brown v. Consolidated Light & Power Co. (1908) 137 Mo. App.
718, 109 S. W. 1032, semble; Freeman v. Foremain (1910) 141 Mo. App. 359,
125 S. W. 524; De Mu) Estate Corp. v. Frankfurt General Ins. Co. (1916)
196 Mo. App. 1, 187 S. W. 1124; Warren v. Missouri & Kansas Telephone
Co. (1917) 196 Mo. App. 549, 196 S. W. 1030, an unequivocal case, the court
declaring that the theory that res ipsa loquitur is only a rule of evidence
supplying the plaintiff with proof of negligence, but that the burden of proof
remains upon the plaintiff is not the law in Missouri. To the same effect,
see Russell v. St. Louis & S. F. Ry. Co. (Mo. 1922) 245 S. W. 590. But cf.
Watson v. Chicago GI. W. R. R. (Mo. 1926) 287 S. W. 813.
73. Jones v. Pelly (Ky. 1910) 128 S. W. 305.
74. Weber v. Chicago, R. I. & P. R. R. Co. (Iowa 1915) 151 N. W. 852,an unequivocal authority for the rule that the burden of proof "shifts"; soalso Nicoll v. Sweet (1913) 163 Iowa 683, 144 N. W. 615. See note 65, supra.
75. Pindell v. Rubenstein (1921) 139 Md. 567, 115 Atl. 859.
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parently in accord."0  So also are Louisiana,"7 Washington, 8 and
Virginia.70 At least some Texas cases are unequivocably com-
mitted to this view.80
But presumption number 2 seems favored in Illinois, 81 Dela-
ware,8 2 Indiana,8 3 Mississippi,"' perhaps South Dakota"5 and Wis-
consin 8 although it is by no means certain, especially in the last
named jurisdiction. 7 In Massachusetts, 8 New Jersey,8 2 Ohio90
76. Johns v. Pennsylvania R. R. Co. (1910) 226 Pa. 319, 75 At. 408,
semble.
77. Dotson v. Louisiana Central Lumber Co. (1918) 144 La. 78, 80 So.205.
78. Johnson v. Light Co. (1927) 253 Pac. 819; Gibson v. Chicago, M. &
P. S. Ry. Co. (1911) 61 Wash. 639, 112 Pac. 919; Potlh v. Dexter Horton
Estate (1926) 140 Wash. 272, 248 Pac. 374.
79. Washington-Virginia Ry. Co. v. Boukight (1912) 113 Va. 696, 75
S. E. 1032. This is a clear case of presumption number 3, with burden of
proof on the defendant, but cf. the earlier case of Richmond Ry. & Electric
Co. v. Hudgins (1902) 100 Va. 409, 41. S. E. 736.
80. Southwestern Telegraph & Telephone Co. v. Sheppard (Tex. 1916)
189 S. W. 799.
'81. Everett v. Foley (1907) 132 Ill. App. 438; Heimberger v. Frog &
Switch Co. (1911) 165 Ill. App. 317; and probably Nawrocki v. Chicago
City Ry. Co. (1910) 156 Ill. App. 563; but Chicago City Ry. Co. v. Eick
(1903) 111 Ill. App. 452, stands for presumption number 3, casting the bur-
den of proof upon the defendant, although, so far as Libby, etc., v. Banks
(1903) 110 Ill. App. 330, is concerned, no more than presumption number 1
is raised.
82. Wood v. Wilmington City Ry. Co. (1906) 5 Pen. (Del.) 369, 64 Atl.
246; Edinanson v. Traction Co. (Del. 1923) 120 Atl. 923.
83. Talge Mahogany Co. v. Hockett (1914) 55 Ind. App. 303, 103 N. E.
815, semble; Pittsburgh, C. C. & St. L. R. R. Co. v. Hoffman (1914) 57 Ind.
App. 431, 107 N. E. 315 1 Pittsburgh, C, C. &' St. L. R. R. Co. v. Arnott
(1920) 189 Ind. 350, 126 N. E. 13; Baltimore & 0. R. R. Co. v. Hill (Ind.
1925) 148 N. E. 489; Artificial Ice, etc., Co. v. Waltz (Ind. 1925) 146 N. E.
826, semble.
84. Alabama & V. R3,. Co. v. Groome (1910) 97 Miss. 201, 52 So. 703.
85. Patterson v. Schlitz Brewinq Co. (1902) 16 S. D. 33, 91 N. W. 336,
but the case is not clear.
86. Carrol v. Chicago, B. & N. R. R. Co. (1898) 99 Wis. 399, 75 N. W.
176, semble; Klitzke v. Webb (1904) 120 Wis. 254, 97 N. W. 901, either pre-
sumption 2 or 3, but more probably 2; Rost v. Roberts (1923) 180 Wis. 207,
192 N. W. 38.
87. Schmidt v. Johnson Co. (1911) 145 Wis. 49, 129 N. W. 657, seems
uncertain, and Mulcairns v. Janesville (1886) 67 Wis. 24, 29 N. W. 565, cited
in the former case, enunciates number 3.
88. Washburn v. Owens (1925) 252 Mass. 47, 147 N. E. 564, and Hull v.
Birkshire St. Ry. Co. (1914) 217 Mass. 361, 104 N. E. 747, look like no more
than number 1.
.89. Higgins v. Goerke-Krich Co. (1918) 91 N. J. L. 464, 103 Atl. 37,case doubtful-may be presumption number 2; Polony v. Brady Sons Co. (N.
J. L. 1924) 126 Atl. 675, undoubtedly this case states number 3; but see the
confused case of Hughes v. Atlantic City &' S. R. R. Co. (1914) 85 N. J. L.
212, 89 Atl. 769. See note 44, supra.
90. Mansfield Public Utility Co. v. Grogg (1921) 103 Ohio St. 301, 133
N. E. 481; St. Mary's Gas Co. v. Brodbeck (1926) 114 Ohio St. 423, 151 N.
E. 323.
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and California," it is not at all clear whether it is the burden of
proof, the burden of producing some evidence to rebut negligence,
or yet no burden at all that is cast upon the defendant. 2
The application of res ipsa loquitur in North Dakota has ap-
parently been rare, and the presumption raised by the doctrine is
not clear. In Wyldes v. Patterson, Bruce, J., treated the prin-
ciple at some length, but his chief concern was with the type of
situation which invoked it. This was also an issue in Leiferman v.
White.94 These two cases represent the totality of North Dakota
law on the matter. In the former case the inference to be gathered
from the dictum is that presumption number 3 is raised and the
burden is on defendant to show no want of due care. The court,
in construing instructions given by the 'trial court to the jury, took
occasion to comment:
"We believe that the court would have been justified in instructing
the jury that, under the evidence in the case, the breaking of the cable
in the manner and under the conditions which it did, raised a presump-
tion that such cable was defective, and that the burden was upon the
defendant to rebut such presumption."' 5
As the trial court did not give such instructions, however, the
case is not authority for either presumption number 2 or number
3, one of which must have been intended in the language quoted.
In the White case, supra, the narrow question was before the court
whether proof of the injury alone was sufficient to support a ver-
dict for the plaintiff. The defendant, after the plaintiff's evidence,
had requested a directed verdict which was denied. At the close
of the trial, and after the jury's verdict, the defendant requested a
new trial, or, in the alternative, a judgment notwithstanding the
verdict, which was likewise denied. The court declared that res
ipsa loquitur applied and that proof of the injury alone was sufficient
evidence to support the jury's verdict. This, of course, means
91. Scellars v. Universal Service (1924) 68 Calif. App. 252, 228 Pac.
879, looks like number 2, but may be only 1. Atkinson v. United Railroads of
San Francisco (1925) 71 Calif. App. 82, 234 Pac. 863, cannot be more than
number 2. See also Onell v. Chappell (1918) 38 Calif. App. 375, 176 Pac. 370.
92. This is true in Utah: Zoccolillo v. Oregon Short Line R. R. (1918)
53 Utah 39, 177 Pac. 201. In this case the court states that an inference mayarise from one or from a series of facts which if unexplained, may not only
justify, but may also require a finding of negligence. But immediately it is
stated that "at least most writers refer to the presumption so called merely as
an inference of fact, and not as a presumption requiring the court to direct a
verdict, even though no explanation is offered." See 177 Pac. 201, at 211.
93. (1915) 31 N. D. 282, 153 N. W. 630.
94. (1918) 40 N. D. 150, 168 N. W. 569.
95. 31 N. D. 282, at 324-325.
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presumption number 1. It means that the plaintiff had satisfied
his burden to produce evidence of negligence. It means that by
proving the injury under the circumstances of the case, he had
offered evidence to warrant the jury in finding that the defendant
had been negligent. The jury, in fact, found that the plaintiff
had also sustained the burden of proof, but that is beside the point
of the case, so far as we are concerned.
Under this presumption, number 1, no burden of any kind was
cast upon the defendant. All that the plaintiff gained by the doctrine
of res ipsa loquitur was to insure that he get to the jury. The latter
might, or might not, find a verdict in his favor, depending on its
judgment as to whether he had satisfied the burden of proof.
He had produced some evidence of negligence when he proved the
injury under the circumstances and established a res ipsa case. The
defendant could offer evidence to rebut the same, or not, just as
he chose. He could assume the risk of non-persuasion without
offering any evidence, if he saw fit, trusting that the jury would
find that the plaintiff had not satisfied his burden of proof. Most
certainly this is presumption number 1, and nothing "shifted" to
the defendant.
The language used by Birdzell, J., in the opinion in Leffernur
v. White emphasizes this as the extent of the application of the
doctrine:
"As we understand the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur, it merely.
permits the jury to draw upon their experience in determining whether
or not a given set of circumstances is consistent with the exercise
of reasonable care on the part of the defendant. It takes the cir-
cumstances themselves as evidence of negligence, because it is rea-
sonable to do so. Surely there can be nothing unreasonable in allowing
the facts surrounding the accident in question to be weighed by the
jury as circumstantial evidence of negligence on the part of the defend-
ant. This is all that is accomplished by the doctrine of res ipsa loqui-
tur. . . . There can be no doubt that, from the evidence descriptive
of the accident itself, a jury would be warranted in finding that the
accident was occasioned by an electric shock received by the plaintiff
while handling an appliance which, in ordinary circumstances, would
not have been sufficiently dangerous to occasion any injury. . . o
But there was a dissenting opinion in this case. While the
ground for differing from the majority opinion was that the case
was not properly one for the application of the doctrine of res
ipsa, Mr. Justice Christianson suggested that his notion of the
effect of the application of the doctrine was not consistent with
96. 40 N. D. 150, at 155.
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that enunciated by the court. While he declares that the doctrine
must be regarded as a rule of evidence rather than one of substan-
tive law, he expressed himself that "the particular force and justice
of the doctrine, regarded as a rule throwing upon the party charged
with negligence the duty of producing evidence, consists in the
circumstances that the chief evidence of the true cause, whether
culpable or innocent, is practically accessible to him, but inacces-
sible to the injured person." 7 Just what is here meant by "duty"
is not clear. If it means that the burden of going forward with
evidence of due care is cast upon the defendant, it is presumption
number 2, and a vastly different doctrine from that which merely
permits proof of the injury to be sufficient evidence of negligence
to get to the jury. If it is the former that is intended by "duty,"
the penalty for a failure to fulfill it is a directed verdict for the
plaintiff;"8 if it is the latter, the case being doubtful, the jury
must pass upon it.9 On the whole, however, it seems safest to
conclude that probably presumption number 1 is the law in North
Dakota in res ipsa cases.
III
The practical questions that arise under these various doc-
trines may be answered separately under four general types of
situations. (1) What is the effect when the defendant offers no
evidence at all to overcome whatever presumption arises for the
plaintiff? (2) What result follows when the defendant offers but
a "scintilla" of evidence? (3) What effect when he produces a
substantial amount of evidence which we may designate as a "whole
lot"? (4) What, finally, must follow when the defendant completely
rebuts the inference of negligence by proving beyond doubt that he
has exercised due care? We shall discuss the effect of the three
presumptions under each of the four situations.
(1) Under presumption number 3, whereby the burden of proof
is said to be upon the defendant by virtue of the doctrine of res
ipsa loquitur, it must be obvious that if he offers nothing what-
ever in evidence, the defendant is not entitled to a directed verdict
in his favor. This is the invariable rule, and is, in part, the situa-
tion out of which the doctrine arose. In Byrne v. Boadle the de-
fendant thought that he was entitled to a non-suit of the plaintiff..
97. Ibid., at 158.
98. See infra, note 111.
99. See supra, note 45.
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But there was evidence of negligence, and, of course, there could be
no directed verdict for the defendant, or, under the old practice,
no non-suit.100
But what if the plaintiff asks for a directed verdict in his favor
when the defendant has offered no evidence. Here we have the
ordinary situation of a party, upon whom the initial burden of proof
to establish his case rested, asking for a directed verdict because
his evidence is uncontradicted, that is, nothing offered in rebuttal.
Some courts, and respectable ones, have held that such cannot be
granted.' 0' The reason, it is said, is that the jury may refuse
to believe the plaintiff's witnesses, and thus the plaintiff loses be-
cause he has not satisfied his initial burden of proof.102  On the
other hand, it is held by some courts that if the defendant fails to
question the credibility of the plaintiff's witnesses, he thereby ad-
mits all that the plaintiff has purported to prove, with the result that
a directed verdict may be made,1 3 if, in the judgment of the court
the totality of evidence is strong enough that, if believed, the jury
100. In some respects, of course, a non-suit differs from a motion for a
directed verdict (See Wigmore "Evidence" 2495), and the latter differs from
a demurrer to the evidence (Ibid., 2495, 3; see Sunderland "Directing a Ver-
dict for the Party Having the Burden of Proof" (1913) 11 Mich. Law Rev.
198). These differences have largely resulted in the modern substitute of a
directed verdict for each of the older forms. It is obvious that the non-suit
can be employed here only by the defendant. It was useful in the type of sit-
uation which, as shown above, gave rise to the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur.
But, when the plaintiff wished to take advantage of his favorable position
under the theory of res ipsa loquitur, or any other presumption, he must
employ something other than a motion for a non-suit. Further, a demurrer
to the evidence was unsatisfactory in that it necessitated an immediate judg-
ment on the merits, by admitting all the facts which the evidence purported
to prove. Thus, if the defendant had a good defense, such as contributory
negligence, he might well hesitate to employ a demurrer to the evidence, lest
the ruling thereon be against him. Furthermore, a demurrer to the evidence
was available only to the party not having the burden of proof. (See Pickel v.
Osgrigg (1881) 6 Fed. 676.)
101. See Sunderland supra, 198, 202, and cases cited; see Wigmore
"Evidence" 2495 (b).
102. See Woodin v. Durfee (1881) 46 Mich. 424, 9 N. W. 457; Charles-
ton Insurance & Trust Co. v. Corner (1844) 2 Gill (Mid.) 410; see Sunder-
land supra, 202. But cf. inference to be drawn from Michigan Pipe Co. v.
Michigan Fire, etc., Insurance Co. (1892) 92 Mich. 482, 52 N. W. 1070, and
see cases cited in note 103, infra.
103. See Sunderland supra, 200-201. It is the duty of the court to direct
a verdict where evidence is undisputed: Wheelocm, v. Clay (1926) 13 Fed.
(2nd) 972; Traffic Motor Truck Corp. v. Claywell (1926) 12 Fed. (2nd) 419;
Sedita v. Steinberg (1926) 105 Conn. 1, 134 Atl. 243. And this is true even if
the verdict is directed for the plaintiff, who has burden of proof: Moore v.
Morris (1926) 116 Okla. 224, 243 Pac. 933. But in Missouri the weight of
testimony is for the jury even when uncontradicted: State v. Cox (1925)
310 Mo. 367, 276 S. W. 869.
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would be warranted in finding but one way, namely, for the plain-
tiff.10 4
What effect, then, does res ipsa loquitur have under the rule
that it raises presumption number a? It must be noticed that the
argument of courts which insist that a failure by the defendant to
produce any evidence authorizes a directed verdict for the plain-
tiff does not contend that such a verdict must be directed, but only
that the court is authorized to so do when it deems the plaintiff's
evidence strong enough to warrant such a direction. It is strong
enough to warrant the directed verdict if, under the circumstances,
no reasonable jury could come to a different conclusion. But under
presumption number 3 it would seem that the court is obliged to
direct a verdict for the plaintiff, in the absence of testimony by
the defendant, for since the burden of proving due care is now on
the latter, a failure to sustain this burden by any evidence whatever
leaves no issue for the jury to consider. The evidence is all one
way; the jury cannot refuse to believe the plaintiff's uncontradicted
witnesses that the injury occurred under such circumstances as
to make it a res ipsa case because such is a question of law for the
court alone to decide'0 5 and uncontradicted testimony cannot be
disregarded;16 by hypothesis, the doctrine of res ipsa not only
furnishes some evidence of negligence, but it furnishes so much
evidence of negligence that the defendant has the burden of ex-
culpating himself. This he has not attempted to do, and a verdict
must be directed against him, logically.10 7  Some res ipsa cases look
as if they supported this result. 08
104. It has been held error to assume a conflict in the evidence where,
though slight, the evidence was uncontradicted: Modern Woodinen v. Lein-
onds (1925) 212 Ky. 83, 278 S. W. 532.105. Cf. Hughes v. Atlantic City & S. R. R. Co. (1914) 85 N. J. L. 212,
89 AtI. 769, and Esving v. Foley, Inc., (1925) 115 Tex. 222, 280 S. W. 499,and the rule stated in the text is confirmed. It is always for the court, not
for the jury, to say whether facts have been proved from which negligencemay be reasonably inferred: Spain v. Burch (1913) 169 Mo. App. 94, 154 S.
W. 172. There is no exclusive province for the jury unless there is an issueas to the existence of such -an act of omission or commission as in lawwould constitute negligence: Smith v. Acme Milling Co. (1913) 34 Okla.
439, 126 Pac. 190. But when evidence is uncontradicted, there is no issue asto the existence of such facts, hence the matter is for the judge. The ques-
tion whether there is evidence tending to show negligence is always one of
law, to be determined from the testimony only: Palmer v. Harrison (1885)
57 Mich. 182, 23 N. W. 624. Cf. the misleading language in syllabus 8, Firszt
v. Capitol Park Realty Co. (1923) 98 Conn. 627, 120 At. 300.106. )See supra, note 103.
107. Webb v. Western Reserve Bond & Share Co. (1926) 115 Ohio St.
247, 153 N. E. 289; Franklin Park v. Franklin (1907) 231 Ill. 380, 83 N. E.
214.
108. "The plaintiffs, however, in this case claim the benefit of the doc-
trine of 'res ipsa loquitur' ; that is, that the accident itself, with all its sur-
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Suppose, however, that the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur raises
only presumption number 2, that is, it casts on the defendant only
the burden or duty of producing evidence of his freedom from neg-
ligence. Again, obviously, the defendant cannot have a verdict
directed in his favor for reasons similar to those which prevail
under presumption number 3. Byrne v. Boadle is again authority
for this. But when the plaintiff asks for a directed verdict because
the defendant has produced no evidence, he is apparently entitled
to get it. The defendant has a burden. Not the burden of con-
vincing the jury that he was not negligent, but the burden of offer-
ing at least some evidence to show that the 'cause of the accident
was one which was consistent with due care on his part. "Any-
thing," as said by Cockburn, C. J., in Kearney v. London, etc., R.
R. Co.,10 9 "which tended to rebut the presumption . . . even
if such evidence were but slight, might have sufficed." But the de-
fendant has failed to sustain the burden of producing anything.
The presumption, then, is that he was negligent, since he has failed
to throw doubt upon it. 10  It is a situation where something is
presumed to be true until it is questioned or evidence is brought
forward to disprove it. This the defendant has not done, and the
general theory of presumptions must result in the court directing
a verdict for the plaintiff."'
roundings, speaks in such way and is of such character as to show negligence
on the part of the defendant company. And that imposes upon it the burdenof rebutting such negligence by proof. This may be one mode of showing
that there is proof of negligence, and if negligence is shown, then that negli-
gence must be met, or the plaintiffs are entitled to recover": Wood v. Wil-
mnington City Ry. Co. (1905) 5 Pen. (Del.) 369, 64 Atl. 246. In Poth v. Dex-
ter Horton Estate (1926) 140 Wash. 272, 248 Pac. 374, the defendant corpora-
tion's evidence, in an action for injuries to one in street struck by a curtain
roller falling from a window of its building was held insufficient, as a -mat-
ter of law, to overcome the effect of the plaintiff's res ipsa case. Cf. Schmidt
v. Stern (1922) 119 Misc. 529, 196 N. Y. Supp. 727; cf. also Elwood v. Con-
iiecticut Ry., etc., Co. (1904) 77 Conn. 145, 58 Atl. 751.
109. (1870) L. R. 5 Q. B. 411.
110. It has been held that although the plaintiff has the burden of proof
of negligence, still in a res ipsa case, if the defendant offers no evidence what-
ever, the plaintiff has successfully met that burden: Lezdne v. Brooklyn, Q.
C. & S. R. R. Co. (1909) 134 App. Div. 606, 119 N. Y. Supp. 315. This is
presumption number 2, of course, and it follows logically that the plaintiff
should be entitled to a directed verdict.
111. Wigmore "Evidence" 2487 (b) ; ibid., 2495 (b). For res ipsa cases
which look as if they supported this result, see Pittsburgh, C. C. & St. L. R.
R. Co. v. Arnott (1920) 189 Ind. 350, 126 N. E. 13; Brown v. Consolidated
Light, Power & Ice Co. (1908) 137 Mo. App. 718, 109 S. W. 1032, although
this confusing case had best be classed as raising presumption number 3, inview of the other Missouri cases. It seems both to affirm and deny presump-
tion number 3. Cf. also language in Adams v. Union Ry. Co. (1903) 80 N.
Y. Supp. 264, 266.
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Under presumption number 1, the problem is simplified. All
the res ipsa cases again support the proposition that the defendant
can have no directed verdict. The least that res ipsa can do is
to furnish sufficient evidence of negligence to take the case to the
jury on behalf of the plaintiff. If this were not true, the doctrine
would be a nullity. It seems equally clear, under this theory, that
the plaintiff can have no directed verdict. He has furnished some
evidence of negligence. By refusing to offer any in rebuttal, the
defendant merely says that he is willing to go to the jury as the
case stands, 112 but he by no means concedes that the plaintiff has
satisfied his initial burden of proof. The jury may yet find for
him, so he is entitled to have the case submitted to it.
(2) Under this hypothetical situation, the defendant has offered
but a scintilla of evidence to prove that he has not been negligent.
What effect does this have under the three variations of res ipsa
loquitur? Under presumption number 3, the burden of proof was
upon the defendant to show that he exercised due care and he has
only offered the slightest bit of evidence to sustain that burden.
The result is clear. In jurisdictions in which the scintilla rule is
still enforced, the case must go to the jury, so that the plaintiff
could not secure a directed verdict." 3  It is patent, of course, that
the defendant could not have a directed verdict in his favor be-
cause he has not met the burden cast upon him. A scintilla of
evidence could not satisfy the burden of proof. But where the
scintilla rule is not good law, the plaintiff is clearly entitled to a
directed verdict on the ground that no reasonable jury would be
warranted in finding that a scintilla of evidence was sufficient to
prove, by a preponderance of evidence, that the defendant had ex-
ercised due care. 114  The court will not permit the jury to return
an unreasonable verdict and where, as here, the judge would be
obliged to grant a new trial because the verdict was contrary to the
weight of evidence, in case the jury found for the defendant, he
should direct a verdict for the plaintiff if he asks for it." 5  Con-
sequently we conclude that if the scintilla rule is enforced the case
112. See Conner, J., in Ross v. Cotton Mills (1905) 140 N. C. 115, 52 S.
E. 121, quoted in Wigmore "Evidence" 2509, at p. 498.
'113. Cf. American Ry. Express Co. v. Henderson (1926) 214 Ala. 268,
107 So. 746; Bray-Robinson Co. v. Haiggins (1925) 210 Ky. 432, 276 S. W.129.
114. Cf. Atlantic National Bank v. More (Ariz. 1925) 241 Pac. 601. Cf.
also Poovey v. International Sugar Feed, etc., Co. (1926) 191 N. C. 722, 133
S. E. 12, and Garrett v. Hnvt (Tex. 1926) 283 S. W. 489.
115. Jack v. Reeves (1906) 78 Ark. 426, 95 S. W. 781; People v. Hutch-
inson (1926) 9 Fed. (2nd) 275; Lavery v. Brigance (Okla. 1926) 242 Pac.
239; Frolng v..Howard (1926) 125 Me. 507, 131 Atl. 308.
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must go to the jury, but if not the plaintiff is entitled to a directed
verdict.
Under presumption number 2, however, the result will be dif-
ferent. If the defendant only has the burden of producing evidence
or "going forward with evidence," a scintilla, however slight its
weight, is enough to make a jury case. The defendant has thrown
doubt upon his negligence, and, by the burden which he was re-
quired to sustain, that was all that he was required to do.118 The
jury may not believe his witnesses, or it may not be impressed
with what they testify, but nevertheless he is entitled to have them
pass upon the evidence, as a whole, for the burden of proof is
still, and always has been, upon the plaintiff to show negligence"17
Here, it seems, is a clear case of a situation which must be sub-
mitted to the jury. The presumption itself, together with the fact
that the defendant has satisfied the only burden that he was under.
insures to both parties the privilege of going to the jury with the
risk of non-persuasion.
Under presumption number 1 certainly the plaintiff is not en-
titled to a directed verdict. He could not have this when the de-
fendant produced no evidence; a fortiori he cannot have it when
some evidence of due care has been offered. As for the defendant's
being entitled to a directed verdict, it is hardly conceivable that so
slight a degree of evidence would be sufficient. It is possible that
the plaintiff's case, even under a res ipsa situation, would be so
weak, that is, there would be such a slight degree of evidence of
negligence,, that the defendant's slight proof of due care would
leave the mind in equipoise, in which case the defendant would be
entitled to win because the plaintiff has failed to satisfy his burden
of proof.11 But here the two quanta of evidence are evaluated
so finely that, while the judge might be justified in granting a new
trial, it is not likely that a verdict would be directed for the de-
fendant, and probably the case would be one for the jury.1 9
(3) When the defendant, in attempting to overcome the effects
116. Wiginore "Evidence" 2487 (d); Thayer "Preliminary Treatise onEvidence" 346.
117. Adams v. Union Ry. Co. (1903) 80 N. Y. Supp. 264; Sweeney v.
Ervinjq (1913) 228 U. S. 233, 57 L. Ed. 815, 33 Sup. Ct. Rep. 416. In Mentz
v. Schieren (1901) 74 N. Y. Supp. 889, the defendant offered some evidence,
but the case was submitted to the jury which found for the plaintiff.
118. ,If the material issues are established, it is the court's duty to direct
a verdict against the party failing of proof: Webi v. Western Reserve Bond
& Share Co. (1925) 115 Ohio St. 247, 153 N. E. 289.
119. Cf. Scellars v. Universal Service (1924) 68 Calif. App. 252, 228
Pac. 879, a new trial granted for other reasons; cf. also While v. Hines
(1921) 182 N. C. 275, 109 S. E. 31.
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of the proof of the accident under the res ipsa loquitur doctrine in-
troduces evidence in substantial quantities, that is, in an amount
and to a degree which we designate as a "whole lot" of evidence
that he has used due care, he at once creates at least a doubtful
proposition out of the issue of negligence so that the case must
go to the jury. The plaintiff is not entitled to a directed verdict
either under presumption number 3, number 2 or number 1. Even
the strongest case for the plaintiff, number 3, only throws the bur-
den of proof upon the defendant, and he has met that duty by offer-
ing for the jury's consideration a goodly quantity of evidence. The
accident, even under presumption number 3, is not per se proof of
negligence.1 2 0  The defendant is entitled to disprove it, and con-
sequently he is certain to get to the jury for they would be war-
ranted in finding that he has used due care?2 ' Obviously, then,
presumptions number 2 and number 1 would present no different
situation, so far as the plaintiff is concerned, and he must be con-
tent to take the risk of non-persuasion unless he can present evidence
to counter-rebut the defendant's proof.
But the plaintiff is not called upon to present further proof.
There is no duty cast upon him to rebut the defendant's evidence
of due care, so the defendant is therefore not entitled to a directed
verdict unless his evidence has been so strong as to establish com-
pletely his freedom from fault, which is contrary to the hypothesis
in this situation.
(4) But suppose that the defendant has replied by offering evi-
dence which is so persuasive that, if believed, there could be no doubt
whatever that he is innocent of negligence. Under these circum-
stances is the defendant entitled to a directed verdict? Under pre-
sumption number 3 we have the identical situation that is encountered
when the plaintiff proves the accident and the attendant circumstances,
and the defendant has the burden of proving that he has not been
negligent. In other words, the situation is just reversed. The de-
fendant has completely sustained his burden, and it is up to the
plaintiff to come forward with proof and sustain his initial burden
to make out a case for the jury. If he fails to do so, the only ob-
jection to directing a verdict for the defendant is that the jury
120. Under' many statutes, however, particular situations are made, perse, proof of negligence. None of the questions involved in the application ofres ipsa loquitur arises here.
121. But if the defendant only offers evidence of equal weight he mustlose, under presumption number 3, which casts upon him the burden ofproving due care: Weber v. Chicago, R. I. & Pac. R. R. (Iowa 1915) 151
N. W. 852.
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might not believe his witnesses. 122 If, however, the plaintiff does
not attack the credibility of the defendant's witnesses and permits
their testimony to go unchallenged, the jury should not be permitted
to discount their uncontradicted testimony, as such would be un-
reasonable and would indicate that the jury had considered evidence
not properly before it.12 3 Under such circumstances the defendant
is entitled to a directed verdict and should have it if he asks for
it. If the plaintiff does not counterbalance his proof, the jury would
be warranted in finding but one verdict, so the trial court must
direct it.1 '4 If the case goes to the jury and it should return a
verdict for the plaintiff the court would have to grant a new trial
on the ground that the verdict was contrary to the weight of evi-
dence, and this is uniformly held to be a situation compelling the
judge to direct the verdict.12 5
This being the situation under presumption number 3, it fol-
lows that a still stronger case is made out for the defendant under
presumptions number 2 and number 1. In the one case the defendant
is only required to produce some evidence and in the other he is
under no duty whatever to produce anything. But he has been able
to produce such evidence as, if believed, will completely rebut any
inference that has arisen against him, and therefore, unless the plain-
tiff produces further evidence to establish his case, the defendant
122. It has been held that the question of whether a telephone company
discharged its burden of proving lack of negligence (presumption number 3,
it will be noticed) which caused a telephone user's injury from electric
shock was for the jury, although the company introduced uncontradicted evi-
dence that its appliances were properly constructed and operated, on theground that the credibility and sufficiency of the defendant's explanation
were for the jury: Warren v. Missouri & Kansas Tel. Co. (1917) 196 Mo.App. 549, 196 S. W. 1030.
'123. Cf. Sunderland supra, note 100, at 206.
124. In Moon v. Fink (1897) 102 Ga. 520, 28 S. E. 980, the presumption
raised by the accident was rebutted by the plaintiff's own witnesses. A non-
suit was ordered. This has always been the law, and the proposition con-
tended for now is but the logical consequence of that rule. This has beenpractically stated in Wisconsin where the court, in reversing a judgment for
the plaintiff, commented on the defendant's rebutting evidence as follows:"Hence, when this proof came in, and was undisputed, the presumption of
negligence from the mere happening of the accident was entirely overthrown,
and nothing was left for the consideration of the jury," citing two Wiscon-silt cases: Klitzke v. Webb (1904) 120 Wis. 254, 97 N. W. 901. In Wash-ington, where presumption number 3 seems to be favored (see infra, note 78)
it has been held that the plaintiff who makes no attempt to show the negli-
gence of the defendant, but relies solely upon the doctrine of res ipsa loqui-
tur, must controvert the defendant's explanation of the cause of the act and
show its insufficiency, or the court will hold, as a natter of law, that thepresumption has been overcome: Scarpelli v. Washington Water Power Co.
(1911) 63 Wash. 18, 114 Pac. 870.
125. See cases cited in supra, note 115.
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must win.126 The plaintiff is now in the same position that he
occupied at the beginning of the trial' 27 and obviously if he now
fails to show any evidence supporting his issues and sustaining his
burden, which he has been under all the time, no jury would be
entitled to find in his favor. This, it seems, presents a situation in
which the judge is compelled to grant the defendant's motion for a
verdict directed in his favor, and if the latter is made, the direction
will certainly be given. To summarize the results of the foregoing
analysis, the following tables may be useful:
PRESUMPTION NUMBER 3
(Casting Burden of Proof on Defendant)
1 2 3 4
Plaintiff's Res ipsa case Same Same Same
proof
Defendant's No evidence Mere scintilla "Whole lot" Rebuts
proof completely
Directed ver-
Directed ver- Same, • except dict f o rRst directd f where scin- Goes to jury, defendant, ifResult d i c t f o r tilla rule pre- ordinarily plaintiff doesplaintiff vails not counter-
rebut
PRESUMPTION NUMBER 2
(Casting on Defendant Burden of Going Forward with Evidence)
1 2 3 4
Plaintiff's Res ipsa case Same ,Same Same
proof
Defendant's No evidence Mere scintilla Whole lot Rebuts
proof completely
Directed ver-
Directed ver- dict f o rfiee .er efendant, ifResult dict f o r Goes to jury Goes to jury plant fplaintiff plaintiff doesnot counter-
rebut
126. Curtis v. New York, N. H. & H. R. R. Co. (1913) 159 App. Div.
757, 144 N. Y. Supp. 1007; Christenson v. Oregon Short Line (1909) 35Utah 137, 99 Pac. 676, seem to be in point. See also Stott v. Southern, etc.,
Power Co. (1920) 47 Calif. App. 242, 190 Pac. 478. Even if the defendant,under presumption number 2, merely meets the plaintiff's proof with evidenceof equal weight, he is entitled to win because the plaintiff has never been
relieved of his burden of proof: Scellars v. Universal Service (1924) 68
Calif. App. 252, 228 Pac. 879. With this compare the opposite result in thecase cited in note 121, because there the situation was worked out under pre-
sumption number 3. The cases are entirely consistent, according to the two
theories of the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur.
127. See Wiqmore "Evidence" 2487 (e), and cases cited in note 8, p.
446.
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PRESUMPTION NUMBER I
(Casting No Burden on Defendant but Making Proof of Accident, etc., Some
Evidence of Negligence)
1 2 3 4
Pl ff's Res ipsa case Same Same Same
Defendant's No .evidence Mere scintilla Whole lot Rebuts
proof completely
Goes to jury in Directed ver-Result Goes to jury Goes to jury most cases defendant
